Akif Emre - Istanbul

It could be said that the most significant move in the Turkish Foreign Policy within the recent period is Ankara's support to the coalition formed under the lead of Saudis against the developments in Yemen. Especially, Turkey's, which abstained from making announcements that targets or sides with the lead actors in the region as the Syria crisis turned into gangrene, participation in the Saudi front was surprising. Besides, Ankara didn't only give its support to Saudis, but also accused Iran openly with a language that is not frequently encountered in diplomatic practices.

It could be expected from the regional rivalry between Turkey and Iran to pave the way for this type of tensions. However, what's really surprising here is the fact that the President would be making an official visit to Tehran after his statements directed at Iran. While this pre-planned visit was not cancelled, Tehran also hosted him warmly. At least, during the official ceremony and statements, there had been no display that reminded or referred to Erdoğan's words.

It was very surprising for the ones, who pursue the regional relations, to see as Iran disregarded Turkey's open support to the Saudi-centric coalition, in other words the coalition encouraged by the U.S., against the Iran-supported Houthi rebellion in Yemen, and the matters in the agenda had been discussed, as if nothing happened, and smoothed over.

There are two questions at this point. First: In what way will Turkey contribute towards a military operation conducted in such a long distance? Is Turkey going to batter Yemen alongside the Saudi and Sudan warplanes? Second: Why did Iran put up with such move by Turkey?

I think that instead of searching for the answers in Yemen, searching for them in the recent developments in Syria would be more on target. While the traditional Iran Foreign Policy doesn't play one sided, it also prioritizes making a strategic move by continuing the fight outside the place they want to protect. Similar to how they wanted to direct the pressure on them since September 11th by making a counter move in Lebanon and Iraq, and if necessary, to protect their position by cooperating with US.

Within this context, it was clear that Iran's move, which would be affecting the balances, right at the resulting phase of the nuclear negotiations, and in return, the Syrian opposition's, who are supported by Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar, ocular gains in the country were not developments that could be disregarded.

After reminding you that the nature of the conflicts in the Middle East, where the game against the state is being conducted through proxy wars and gain a sectarian or ethnic nature from time to time, are an element of negotiation in the lion's den, rather than moral and principal worries, let's continue observing possible situations.

It became obvious that the Baas forces' fighting strength is gradually showing signs of running out. In return, we are facing a display where the desire is to have all the energy of the opposition spent in fighting each other, rather than achieving a success. It seems that, in a military sense, the new Saudi-centric coalition is implementing a strategy in Syria that will feel its weight. It would be more precise to observe the actual response to Turkey's active support to the coalition against the Houthis in Yemen, within the military operation in Syria. Especially, by helping the “combatants” without a jihad, this is an attempt to form a new balance which will gain the support of the West.

In this way, by starting a jihad against jihad, this is a balance pursuit, where the moderate oppositions will be designative in the possible Syria negotiation. This is a scenario, which had been fictionalized by some circles since the beginning, to present Al Qaeda or ISIL as moderate and, if possible, to persuade them to a secular opposition.

If the nuclear negotiations in Lausanne are confirmed in Iran and if the relation between Tehran and the West will open a new page, then one of the costs for this will most likely be the outcome of the civil war in Syria. This situation makes us think about the question of “what other subject could have been laid on the table as a negotiation element other than the official agenda of the Lausanne Agreement?” Similar to how one of the most exciting arguments of Turkey's modern political history had been a subjected to the secret clauses of the Lausanne Agreement.

Instead of making speculations in this matter, basing on the facts; the sides in Syria are entering a new period. The non-jihadist combatants are being supported and released to the field, and thus, an attempt is being made to increase the negotiation chance before sitting at the negotiation table. How much longer can Iran carry the Syria weight? It's dubious.

However, as they gained an extremely strategic advantage after the nuclear agreement, we could say that they are open to new consensuses on the matter of the Baas regime. In this case, Turkey might be hoping to acquire the concrete response to the open support it gave to the coalition, led by the Saudis, in Syria, and thus get rid of the problem, which became an internal problem in the long run and which started to affect Ankara's political equation.

Even though there will be no revolution under the lead of non-jihadist combatants, instead of the combatants who were departed with the objective of the Islamic revolution, the footsteps of a new period being persuaded to a moderate change is being heard…. The winners in the game of state might not be the visible actors in the field; even the ones, who are being fought for on behalf, might not win….