ISIL's sociology

The angered dynamism's taking up arms in the name of Islam had become easy, by disregarding all kinds of cultural and historical sociological differences

ISIL's sociology

Akif Emre

I should state this from the beginning; this article is not the examination of Salafism or another superstitious, practical sect in terms of theology. Within the frame of the Koran and Sunnah, a Muslim can adapt to different comments and opinions. In this context, it's self-evident that there is a right to choose within Islamic understandings.

The results and manifestations of the cultural, sociological aspects of the religion's relativity and sectarian understanding can be argued separately from this. It's worth examining the questions; why did the understanding of religion, which is named New Salafism and stays close to Wahhabism, gain more extensity and become a charm within certain circles/geographies, and how did it trigger the dynamism? Especially in the regions where the Hanafi/Sunni/Sufistic tradition is dominant and this tradition's strong manifestations are represented until today, the political and sociological reasons of why these kind of objector, exclusivist, irreconcilable attitudes are deemed proper among the youngsters, even though their group is a minority, and should be emphasized in all seriousness rather than it's religious aspects.

Without a doubt, we are not talking about a communal period that develops on its own. Some political manipulations had great contributions in the creation of this understanding, which doesn't contravene with the traditional religious structure and the sociocultural tissue. Feeling anger and rage towards the factors and conditions that pave the way and encourage the religious understandings of formations like Al-Qaida and ISIL, instead of understanding and analyzing them, is not sufficient to solve the issue.

Actually, when we retrogress, we can easily see how these developments are weaved step by step.

Before going too far, a couple of previews from the close geography might be explanatory enough. Since I had been intensely interested in the Balkans even before the collapse of Yugoslavia, I think that I can see small developments in this region, which are unnoticed from a distance, beforehand. Two things were revealed during the breaking down period of Yugoslavia: The first one is Muslims embarked on a quest of identity and by making use of the freedom environment, which is experienced relatively, they had started to cling on to whatever is out there in the name of religion. Another matter, which seems less important although it is an indicator, is the severance of the communication-interaction between the Muslims that existed in the Yugoslavia period. Also in the countries like Albania and Bulgaria, where more strict administrations are conducted, the gap that appeared within the religious field had started to be filled gropingly in a similar way.

In this period, Saudi Arabia, being in the first place, had laid hands on the region, and with great opportunities of the period's conditions, had brought the youth to their country for education. A similar implementation had been conducted in Turkey at the beginning of the 80s, but since it wasn't found productive enough, the Saudis had suspended this project in time.

The youth, who came from the Balkans and couldn't have contact with religion other than preserving their identities as Muslims, were dealing with religious education for the first time in a disciplinary sense.

The families from Albania, Bosnia, Pomak, etc., who had sent their kids with great expectations, were hoping that these kids would make the religious field, which is left barren by the atheist administration, green and contribute to the strengthening of cultural relations.

After a while, when these kids returned to their countries, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Albania and Kosovo, a weird situation would be appearing. There was a great gap between their parents' religious views and the religion taught to them, which couldn't be covered.

According to the understanding of religion that was taught to them, their families being in the first place, the community they belonged to couldn't even be called Muslims. According to this understanding, this community's practices were full of 'innovation' and also their beliefs were full of 'polytheism'. Also the community had alienated the kids, whom arrived recently. What they explain in the name of religion and their outfits were neither coinciding with tradition nor with the religious information they know. These kids would oppose their families in the first place, and even start quarreling, and this confrontation would be reflected on the community. During that period, I had witnessed the discussions and conflicts experienced between the religious structure and understandings, which are formed with traditional codes, and the ones, who had studied in countries like Saudi Arabia and returned. The issues, which are not on the agenda of any Muslim, and the subjects had suddenly come to the top of the agenda, and discussions, where everything would be subjected to a faith-curse matter, were being made.

To summarize: the generation, which had been sent with the hopes that they will have contributions in the reading of Islamic sciences, community's Islamification and the returning to their identities, had become inactive and even had started a conflict with their own community.

In a short time, they had been alienated and become marginal groups in between themselves. The most dynamic elements of the Balkan geography, leave aside contributing to the reclamation and the Islamification of the community, had become the reason of this conflict and chaos in the community. This young dynamic generation, which is in limited numbers at the small Balkan countries, didn't only marginalize in the name of religion. The generation also had moved away from becoming a model that can set an example for the community in the name of religion. and became elements that prevented one from being religious.

This structuring in the Balkans, had experienced a similar experience in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The interesting part of this is, especially during the period, when the religious education and religious activities were limited in Central Asia and the Caucasus, the doors were opened to this type of structuring. In fact, a sociocultural barrage had been built in front of the religious life and the religion's socialization.

On the other hand, the angered dynamism's taking up arms in the name of Islam had become easy, by disregarding all kinds of cultural and historical sociological differences. The Middle East's oppressive regimes were already feeding this environment enough. The sociopolitical structure of the Middle East, which doesn't regard any Islam understanding other than their own understanding as Muslimism and feeds the structure that is exclusivist, and has the tendency towards violence, had formed a nutritious environment for the neo-Salafi understanding. The radicalization of the opposition understanding, which disregards the 1400-year-long experience, civilization horizon, accumulation and envisagement of the Islamic world and is ready to imprison everyone in the name of religion, and directs Islam's indispensable concepts like jihad and ummah, or believer nation, by taking them hostage, was related with the operation part of the task.

The violence, which had been legitimated by the anger felt towards the despotic administrations that had become the character of the region with the support of Westerners, and the nihilistic rejectionist and exclusivist structuring would be coming up.

As a result, this unusual group ends up being caught in the middle between two different religious views and lifestyles. Similar to the way in which they cannot be regarded free from the cultural, social and political environment, in which they cannot even communicate with their own community but still claim of saving ummah , they are also not free from the injections of deserted religious understanding.

Last Mod: 19 Ağustos 2014, 11:34
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